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The “Cooperation Revolution” and the Professional
Ethics of Giving Advice on Executive Protection
Issues
By Sarah H. Duggin, Shannon “A.J.” Singleton, and James D. Wing*
In today’s law enforcement environment, business entities facing criminal investigations
and possible indictment have little practical choice but to cooperate with authorities. Cooperation offers the opportunity to avoid a costly trial and attendant adverse reputational,
financial, and morale impacts. Resolution of potential criminal charges, however, almost
always requires entities to cooperate with law enforcement efforts to impose criminal liability on individual business executives.
While businesses and their executives once generally perceived their interests as closely
aligned, the “Cooperation Revolution” of the last few decades has forced corporate boards
and business executives to reassess their individual obligations and risks. In so doing, they
often turn to corporate lawyers, particularly general counsel, for assistance in evaluating
and enhancing executive protection plans encompassing exculpation, indemnification, and
fee advancement. These questions raise complex substantive issues and—because corporate
counsel owe their fiduciary obligations to the entity itself—the evaluation and design of
plans created to protect individuals often raises challenging ethical dilemmas. Legal advice
provided on a “clear day” when the possibility of involvement in a criminal investigation
seems remote may be perceived very differently on a “stormy day” when law enforcement
officials are at the door.
The purpose of this article is to explore the evolution and ongoing impacts of the “Cooperation Revolution” on business entities and their directors, officers, and lawyers with a
particular focus on how corporate counsel can advise governing bodies on executive
* Sarah Duggin is Professor of Law and Director of the Compliance, Investigations & Corporate
Responsibility Program at The Catholic University of America’s Columbus School of Law. Prior to
joining the CUA faculty, Sarah served as Vice President and General Counsel of the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), as Chief Counsel of the University of Pennsylvania Health System,
and as a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Williams & Connolly. Sarah has published numerous articles in the fields of corporate law, legal ethics, compliance and corporate responsibility,
and constitutional law. She is also an Episcopal priest.
Shannon “A.J.” Singleton is a Member and General Counsel of Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC. He is
part of the Business Litigation practice, concentrating on Business Torts and Trust & Estates. A.J. represents financial institutions, as well as other business clients, and he frequently advises lawyers and
law firms on ethics issues. He is a frequent lecturer on law industry issues, including conflicts of interest, client confidentiality, attorney-client privilege, law firm advertising and risk management, and
law firm departures.
James D. Wing’s practice focuses on international litigation and arbitration in a wide variety of
commercial contexts. He has represented numerous directors and C-Suite officers seeking advancement, indemnification, and insurance coverage relating to both civil claims and criminal charges. He
is Chair of the Director and Officer Liability Committee of the ABA Business Law Section. He is a
frequent presenter and author on these subjects.
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protection plans in ways that offer the best possible assistance to their clients while appropriately protecting themselves.

I. THE PROBLEM
Since the 1990s, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and other law
enforcement agencies have regularly enlisted the private sector in investigations
of business entities. Just as acquiring entities often use a target organization’s assets to support a leveraged buyout, law enforcement authorities frequently leverage their prosecutorial resources by encouraging entities under investigation to
identify individuals potentially involved in alleged wrongdoing. Businesses accede to government requests in the hope of obtaining more favorable treatment
of the entities themselves. This kind of cooperation has become a pre-condition
for deferred and non-prosecution agreements as well as settlements based on
lesser charges than otherwise might be filed.
As a practical matter, when a business entity uncovers potentially significant
wrongdoing through its compliance program or becomes a target of a government investigation, the company has little choice but to offer to “cooperate”
with law enforcement authorities. Hardly a week goes by without news media
reporting that an entity is “cooperating” with prosecutors or other governmental
enforcement authorities in the investigation of alleged wrongdoing.
Cooperation with law enforcement authorities can enable entities to resolve potential criminal charges and significant civil enforcement matters without going through
a risky trial and enduring attendant business disruptions, reputational harm, and adverse impacts on morale. Cooperating is generally perceived as far less costly than
going to trial, even if a settlement requires the entity to admit to a legal violation
and pay millions of dollars in fines or penalties. The advantages of even an expensive
settlement, when weighed against the financial and reputational harm of possible
criminal conviction, present an opportunity few businesses can afford to reject. In
fact, sometimes such cooperation is essential to the entity’s very survival.
This reality—the “Cooperation Revolution”1—forces corporate boards2 and senior executives to reassess their individual responsibilities and risks. Major
investigations are perilous not only for organizations but for their officers and directors personally. Settlements reached through deferred prosecution agreements
often require entities to cooperate with law enforcement efforts to impose criminal
responsibility on individuals. Consequently, the need for effective indemnification
1. To the best of our knowledge, the term “Cooperation Revolution” was coined by co-author
James Wing and first appeared in print in a 2015 article in The Business Lawyer. See James D.
Wing & Andrew L. Oringer, Discipline Involving Multiple Disciplines—Protecting Innocent Executives
in the Age of Cooperation, 70 BUS. LAW. 1123, 1124 (2015).
2. Throughout this article we refer to “corporate boards,” “corporate officers and directors,” “managers,” and the like. As suggested above, however, the issues and concerns discussed are not limited
to incorporated entities. They apply equally to any business entity, as well as to many not-for-profit
organizations, regardless of whether the entity is a corporation, a partnership, a limited liability company, or another “alternative” entity or organization. Similarly, when we use the terms “executives,”
“directors,” or “officers,” we intend those terms to include “managers” or persons discharging similar
responsibilities for alternative entities.
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and advancement provisions for the entity’s constituents (notably, the entity’s directors and officers) in governance documents, protective clauses in individual
contracts, and broad insurance coverage is greater than ever before.
General counsel and other corporate lawyers3 play an essential role in ameliorating individual constituents’ legal risks. It is to corporate counsel that boards,
and senior executives generally first turn for guidance on devising effective executive protection plans or evaluating the elements of an existing plan.4 The
issue arises on the “clear day”—before a major claim or potential scandal manifests itself.5 If boards and executives await the “stormy day” before seeking such
guidance—after allegations of wrongdoing surface, an investigation begins, or
law enforcement authorities come knocking—it is often too late. Even when
an entity’s charter provides for indemnification to the “fullest extent permitted
by law,” analysis of executive protection plans is often fraught with difficulties
pertaining to interpretation of bylaws given the legal effect of contractual agreements with individual executives, the impact of allegations of misconduct an
entity may not legally indemnify, the scope of insurance coverage, the enforceability of fee advancement, the consequences of settlements, and a host of related
matters.
When corporate boards or senior executives request advice on executive protection from entity counsel, serious ethical questions immediately arise. The first
consideration, of course, is “Who is the client?”
Like any attorney representing an entity, in-house counsel owe their fiduciary
and professional obligations to the entity itself. But corporations and other business entities speak only through their constituents.6 Corporate law has long
3. The focus of this article is on an entity’s in-house “general counsel” or similar position. However, the issues, analysis, and best practices addressed herein apply equally to any attorney representing an entity on these issues, including outside counsel from a private law firm who serve as an entity
client’s de facto in-house counsel.
4. Throughout this article we use the term “executive protection plan” to refer to the combination
of rights to exculpation, advancement, and indemnification contained within entity foundational documents, statutes, professional liability insurance policies, or directors and officers liability insurance
policies. A classic article considers these rights together as separate elements of a unitary program of
protection that may be embodied in a corporation’s charter and bylaws, as well as insurance policies
and individual contractual agreements. See E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399 (1987).
5. The terms “clear day” and “stormy day” were used in the Wing and Oringer article based on
Delaware case law that refers to the term “clear day” as “proverbial.” The article describes the
“clear day” as implying the time “when an executive protection program is first instituted or even renewed, [and] there is no hint of a legal violation that can result in an investigation and an adversity of
interest between executives and the corporation.” Wing & Oringer, supra note 1, at 1129 n.18. In
contrast, the “stormy day” arrives when “an issue of corporate misconduct arises” and the executive
protection program is put to the test. Id. at 1131.
6. “Constituents” is a term of art used in ethics law. ABA Model Rule 1.13(a) notes: “A lawyer is
employed or retained by an organization to represent the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.” MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2020) (emphasis added); see also id. 1.13 cmt. 1
(“An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the
constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally
to unincorporated associations. ‘Other constituents’ as used in this Comment means the positions
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recognized that entities have an interest in attracting and retaining qualified and
talented personnel by relieving them of the financial burden of defending meritless litigation arising from their service.7 A corporate board, through directors
acting collectively as the entity’s highest authority, may instruct a general counsel
to analyze and provide advice on the protection the entity affords directors
and officers personally. One or more of those directors or senior executives
may ask general counsel the same question on an individual basis. Obviously,
general counsel may not give different answers to the same question simply because the entity speaking through its board is the client, but directors, personally, are unrepresented constituents. They are, after all, the same individuals.
Given the “Cooperation Revolution,” in both cases general counsel may be
asked on a “clear day” to provide advice on executive protection plans designed
to safeguard directors and senior officers on a later “stormy day” when the entity
and/or its senior executives come under investigation. The problem is that the
interests of the entity and those of its senior executives are generally aligned
on the “clear day,” but the interests of an entity that cooperates with law enforcement authorities may later fall into severe conflict with the interests of one or
more of the constituents whom the entity has promised to protect. How does
counsel respond on a “clear day,” knowing that a “stormy day” may well
arise? If asked on a developing or actual “stormy day,” is there a different answer?
The substantive law of executive protection involves complex legal questions
and many uncertainties that tax the knowledge and skills of even practitioners
who are expert in the field. While the board of directors must determine the appropriate level of protection the entity will provide to directors and senior executives, boards rely on counsel to supply the information they need to reach this
decision. General counsel asked to provide advice on executive protection plans
may later encounter criticism that the plan is too favorable to beneficiaries if a
subsequent board regards those executives as miscreants. Conversely, individuals facing investigations (and the high legal fees they ordinarily entail) may blame
counsel if the plan provides directors and officers with less protection than they
believe, in hindsight, it should. How do counsel in this position protect themselves from criticism, and perhaps even from potential professional liability, if
the answer the attorney gave on the “clear day” turns out to be incomplete or
lacking in some fashion once the “stormy day” arrives? Given current law enforcement trends, this is not a negligible risk.
The purpose of this article is to explore the evolution and ongoing impacts of
the “Cooperation Revolution” on business entities and the directors, officers, and
counsel who serve them. The article identifies resources available to general
counsel and other corporate lawyers to check the comprehensiveness and balance of executive protection plans. It suggests that counsel might work with
boards in ways that minimize their risk when advising on executive protection
equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.”).
7. See Wing & Oringer, supra note 1, at 1127 n.14.
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plans, particularly by structuring the manner in which the board requests this
kind of advice. Along the way, the article identifies ethical rules and principles
that come into play when both boards, qua boards, and protected entity constituents seek advice from corporate counsel on their rights to exculpation, advancement, indemnification, and liability insurance protection.

II. THE “COOPERATION REVOLUTION” AND ITS IMPACT
EXECUTIVES AND ENTITY COUNSEL

ON

BUSINESS

The “Cooperation Revolution” can have serious, real-life ramifications for entity
officers, directors, and other constituents—including those who are innocent of
any wrongdoing—when the entity they once served or continue to serve becomes
the target of law enforcement. Lost jobs, damaged reputations, seriously adverse
health impacts, and financial ruin are very real risks for these individuals.
In a March 3, 2022 speech to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 37th National Institute on White Collar Crime, Attorney General Merrick Garland made it
clear that “the prosecution of corporate crime is a Justice Department priority,”8
and that the Department will focus on individuals in seeking to hold business entities accountable. Mr. Garland stressed that “the prosecution of individuals is our
first priority because it is essential to Americans’ trust in the rule of law. . . . [T]he
rule of law requires that there not be one rule for the powerful and another for the
powerless; one rule for the rich and another for the poor.”9
Referring to Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco’s statement in her October
2021 keynote address to the ABA’s 36th National Institute on White Collar
Crime,10 Mr. Garland reiterated that the Justice Department is restoring “prior
Department guidance making clear that, to be eligible for any cooperation credit,
companies must provide the Justice Department with all non-privileged information about individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue,”
and emphasized that the entity must identify all individuals involved in the misconduct, regardless of their “position, status, or seniority” and regardless of
whether the entity deems an individual’s involvement as “substantial.”11
Mr. Garland was explicit about the implications of this guidance for the private
sector: “When the Justice Department offers a company the opportunity to enter
into a resolution for its misconduct, it is in that company’s best interest to provide
us with a full picture of what happened and who was involved. When we give a
company an opportunity to come clean, it must come clean about everyone involved
in the misconduct, at every level.”12 In a subsequent September 2022 guidance
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Delivers Remarks to
the ABA Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 3, 2022), [hereinafter Garland Press Release]; see also
AG Garland Defends Crack-down on White Collar Crime, ABA NEWS (Mar. 7, 2022).
9. Garland Press Release, supra note 8.
10. Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco Gives Keynote Address at ABA’s 36th National Institute on White Collar Crime (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorneygeneral-lisa-o-monaco-gives-keynote-address-abas-36th-national-institute.
11. Garland Press Release, supra note 8.
12. Id.
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memorandum, Ms. Monaco stressed that companies must report information
pertaining to individuals “on a timely basis” to receive full cooperation credit
and instructed prosecutors that they “must strive to complete investigations
into individuals—and seek any warranted individual criminal charges—prior
to or simultaneously with the entry of a resolution against the corporation.”13
As the remarks of Attorney General Garland and Deputy Attorney General
Monaco illustrate, the Biden Justice Department is breathing new life into policies requiring business organizations seeking credit for cooperating with the government in criminal and civil enforcement proceedings to turn over information
on individuals that it gains through corporate compliance programs and internal
investigations. For more than two decades, these policies have served as an increasingly effective means of leveraging prosecutorial resources in federal investigations of corporations and other business entities.14
Understanding the genesis and evolution of the “Cooperation Revolution” is critical to appreciating the importance of carefully designed executive protection plans
to both individual executives and business organizations. Appreciating the impact
of the “Cooperation Revolution” on individual directors and officers is essential for
corporate drafting. This section offers a brief summary of key developments.

A. THE EMERGENCE

OF THE

“COOPERATION REVOLUTION”

The publication of the United States Sentencing Commission’s Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 set the stage for the “Cooperation Revolution.”15
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated as part of the reforms
mandated by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,16 included provisions that allowed for downward departures—i.e., lower penalties—for businesses that had “effective” compliance programs in place at the time of the events
that led to their prosecution.17
13. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Lisa O. Monaco for Assistant Att’ys Gen. & U.S. Attorneys, Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies Following Discussions with Corporate Crime Advisory Group (Sept. 15, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1535301/
download. Among other things, in discussing evaluation of both prior misconduct and corporate
compliance plans, Deputy Attorney General Monaco also emphasized the importance of clawback
provisions enabling companies to impose financial sanctions against individuals who contribute to
criminal conduct directly or in a supervisory capacity. Id.
14. See, e.g., Robert S. Bennett, Hilary Holt LoCicero & Brooks M. Hanner, From Regulation to Prosecution to Cooperation: Trends in Corporate White Collar Crime Enforcement and the Evolving Role of the
White Collar Criminal Defense Attorney, 68 BUS. LAW. 411 (2013); Jonathan A. Forman & Samuel
Light, Recent Government Policies Deputize Companies to Root Out Global Corruption, BUS. L. TODAY,
June 2016, at 39.
15. Bennett, LoCicero & Hanner, supra note 14, at 418–20. This landmark article provides an excellent and detailed discussion of the evolution of white-collar criminal enforcement and the cooperation approach through 2012.
16. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C.).
17. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 8 (1991) (Sentencing of Organizations). Since the organizational sentencing guidelines were first published in 1991, the United States
Sentencing Commission has not only retained, but expanded, the provisions pertaining to effective
compliance and ethics programs. The most recent iteration, for example, now refers to an “effective
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Five years later the Delaware Chancery Court decided In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation.18 In reviewing a proposed settlement agreement
in a shareholders’ derivative action, the court concluded that in some circumstances directors of corporations convicted of criminal wrongdoing could be
held personally liable in shareholder litigation for sustained or systemic failures
to ensure that their companies had effective compliance programs in place.19
Caremark added powerful personal incentives for corporate boards to focus on
establishing the kinds of compliance programs called for by the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines. Taken together, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and the Caremark decision laid the foundation for a new prosecutorial
focus on corporate compliance and disclosure and set the stage for the criminalization of legal risk to corporate officers and directors.20
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder added a critical piece to the emerging
framework in 1999. In a guidance document issued to DOJ attorneys (the “Holder Memorandum”), Mr. Holder instructed federal prosecutors to consider eight
factors in determining whether to bring criminal charges against business entities.21 The Holder Memorandum specifically identified the “corporation’s timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate” with
the government as one of these factors.22 Mr. Holder also admonished that
“[p]rosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation.”23
In 2003, in the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom debacles, the implosion of Arthur Andersen, and other high-profile corporate scandals, Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson issued new guidance on charging business
organizations with criminal wrongdoing, emphasizing the need for increased
“scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”24 Among other
things, Mr. Thompson reiterated the key elements of the Holder Memorandum
and added a ninth factor pertaining to the adequacy of civil or regulatory enforcement actions to the list prosecutors should consider.25 The most significant
change, however, was Mr. Thompson’s expansion of the definition of corporate
cooperation to encompass “if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client
compliance and ethics program.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES ch. 8 (2021)
(Sentencing of Organizations).
18. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
19. Id. at 970.
20. See Wing & Oringer, supra note 1, at 1123–24.
21. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads & U.S.
Att’ys re: Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations ( June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF.
22. Id. at 3. The Holder Memorandum further explained: “the prosecutor may consider the corporation’s willingness to identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior executives,
to make witnesses available, to disclose the complete results of its internal investigation, and [with
some limitations] to waive the attorney-client and work product privileges,” id. at 5, as well as apparent protection of culpable individuals. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components & U.S. Att’ys re: Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations ( Jan. 20, 2003).
25. Id. at 3–4.
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privilege and work product protection and apparent protection of ‘culpable individuals’ through fee advancement and other means unless required by law.”26
The Thompson Memorandum’s focus on waiver of attorney-client privilege
and work-product protections as indicia of corporate cooperation gave rise to
a firestorm of protests. The ABA, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and a number of other advocacy groups, practitioners, and scholars
vehemently objected. They urged that these new cooperation criteria created unconstitutional pressure on companies to waive the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protections and presaged dire consequences for individuals
caught in the crossfire.27
The dispute over the Thompson Memorandum came to a head in the course of
a federal investigation of both KPMG, Inc. and a number of KPMG partners for
promoting allegedly illegal tax shelters.28 KPMG decided to cooperate with federal authorities. It agreed to withdraw from joint defense agreements with potential individual defendants and to stop advancing legal fees and expenses to
KPMG partners who were not cooperating with the investigation.29 In United
States v. Stein, targeted partners challenged these actions. The partners argued
that the pressure the government exerted on KPMG to cease advancing legal
fees and to withdraw from joint defense agreements violated the partners’ rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.30 The partners prevailed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the court dismissed the indictments in relevant parts.31 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed.32
26. Id. at 7–8.
27. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Martz, Report from the Front Lines: The Thompson Memorandum and the
KPMG Tax Shelter Case, WALL ST. LAW. (Aug. 2006); ABA Takes Aim at Thomson Memorandum,
Again, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB-2103; The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Karen J. Mathis, President of the American Bar Association),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg34117/pdf/CHRG-109shrg34117.pdf.
28. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Stein I) aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 (2d
Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Stein IV).
29. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341 (2008); see also Mark Gideon &
Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Cooperation During Investigations and Audits, 13 STANFORD J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 1 (2008).
30. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
31. Id. at 382 (granting the KPMG Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictments in part “only to
the extent that . . . [t]he court declares that so much of the Thompson Memorandum and the activities of the USAO as threatened to take into account, in deciding whether to indict KPMG, whether
KPMG would advance attorneys’ fees to present or former employees in the event they were indicted
for activities undertaken in the course of their employment interfered with the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the effective assistance of counsel and therefore violated the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution”); see also Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (“This Court held in Stein
I that the government violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the KPMG Defendants by
causing KPMG to depart from its prior practice of paying the legal expenses of KPMG personnel
in all cases in which they were sued in consequence of their activities on behalf of the firm. It
found that KPMG would have paid those expenses—whether legally obligated to do so or not—
but for the government’s improper actions.” (internal citations omitted)).
32. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Following the district court’s June 2006 decision in Stein, the DOJ backed away
from privilege waiver and anti-fee advancement demands. In December 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty issued new guidance to federal prosecutors.33
Acknowledging the legal community’s concern that DOJ practices might “discourag[e]
full and candid communications between corporate employees and legal counsel,”34
Mr. McNulty instructed: “Prosecutors may only request waiver of attorney-client
and work product protections when there is a legitimate need . . . [after] a careful
balancing of important policy considerations underlying the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and the law enforcement needs of the government’s
investigation.”35 He stated that federal “[p]rosecutors generally should not take into
account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to employees or agents
under investigation and indictment” in assessing cooperation.36
Two years later, Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip issued yet another guidance memorandum,37 and the DOJ incorporated the approach into the United
States Attorneys’ Manual.38 Mr. Filip prohibited prosecutors from seeking privilege
and work product protection waivers except where “a corporation or one of its
employees . . . asserts an advice-of-counsel defense, based upon communications
with in-house or outside counsel that took place prior to or contemporaneously
with the underlying conduct at issue”39 or where the “[c]ommunications [are] between a corporation (through its officers, employees, directors, or agents) and
corporate counsel are made in furtherance of a crime or fraud.”40 The Filip Memorandum also acknowledged that “the mere participation by a corporation in a
33. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components &
U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 11.
37. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components &
U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [hereinafter
Filip Memo].
38. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-28.000 to 9-28.1300 (2008) (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).
39. Filip Memo, supra note 37, at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 12 (“The Department
cannot fairly be asked to discharge its responsibility to the public to investigate alleged corporate
crime, or to temper what would be the appropriate course of prosecutorial action, by simply accepting on faith an otherwise unproven assertion that an attorney—perhaps even an unnamed attorney—
approved potentially unlawful practices. Accordingly, where an advice-of-counsel defense has been
asserted, prosecutors may ask for the disclosure of the communications allegedly supporting it.”).
The question of whether an accused possessed the necessary mens rea is a significant element of
most criminal trials. “Advice of counsel” is not a recognized stand-alone criminal defense, but merely
a component of the general issue of criminal intent. White collar defendants frequently argue that
actions or inactions of general counsel contributed to the conduct for which they are being charged.
If general counsel is immunized and testifies adversely to the charged executive, communications to
and from counsel easily rise to the status of Brady material and can create issues relating to the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. One possible effect of the Filip Memorandum is to
put on charged executives the government’s task, as well as the associated expense, of obtaining
and reviewing exculpatory evidence in the heat of trial, rather than requiring the government to review this material before making charging decisions. This is a rarely recognized adverse consequence
of the “Cooperation Revolution.”
40. Filip Memo, supra note 37, at 12.
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joint defense agreement does not render the corporation ineligible to receive
cooperation credit” and that “prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from entering into such agreements.”41 Mr. Filip strengthened the McNulty
guidance on fee advancement: “In evaluating cooperation, however, prosecutors
should not take into account whether a corporation is advancing or reimbursing
attorneys’ fees or providing counsel to employees, officers, or directors under investigation or indictment. Likewise, prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from taking such action.”42
These developments removed any doubt that indemnification and advancement of fees to directors and officers subject to criminal and administrative
proceedings arising from their service to an entity are permissible subjects of
an executive protection plan.
Mr. Filip’s guidance remained the last word until 2015 when Deputy Attorney
General Sally Yates enunciated an aggressive policy to persuade businesses to
“cough up” “high-level executives who perpetrated the misconduct.”43 Ms. Yates
reiterated in a formal memorandum that the DOJ would continue to base cooperation credit calculations on established factors. But she emphasized: “One of the
most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability
from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”44
The Yates Memorandum specified that business organizations seeking cooperation credit “must provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct.”45 It instructed that both “criminal and civil
corporate investigations [were to] focus on individuals from the inception of the
investigation,”46 and directed DOJ attorneys not to “resolve matters with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and [to] memorialize
any declinations as to individuals in such cases.”47 This new guidance exacerbated
the widening rift between business entities and individuals associated with them.48
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at New York University School of Law
Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-deliversremarks-new-york-university-school.
44. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., for Assistant Att’ys Gen. & U.S. Att’ys,
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memo]; see
also Sarah H. Duggin, Stephen Braga, Adam P. Schwartz & James Wing, Ethical Rules and Professional
Liability Risks of Business Lawyers Advising on Executive Protection Programs, BUS. L. TODAY ( June 28,
2019), https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/06/ethical-rules-professional-liability-risks-business-lawyersadvising-executive-protection-programs.
45. Yates Memo, supra note 44, at 2.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 2–3.
48. See, e.g., Gary G. Grindler & Laura K. Bennett, True Cooperation: DOJ’s Reshaped Conversation
and Its Consequences, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2015, at 32; Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum, 51
U.C. Davis L.J. 1589 (2018); David Douglas, William Pericak & Leo Reichert, Impact of DOJ’s Corporate
Healthcare Fraud Enforcement Strategies on Organizations and Defense Counsel, HEALTH LAW., Aug.
2017, at 42; Adam Rahman, Cooperation and Its Discontents: The Constitutional and Policy Implications
of the DOJ’s War on Corporate Crime, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323 (2016); Brandon L. Garrett,
The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60 (2016); Sharon
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A few years later, in 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein relaxed to
some extent what he characterized as the “binary” proposition of the Yates Memorandum.49 Mr. Rosenstein stated that prosecutors would no longer take an “all
or nothing” approach to cooperation. Rather, corporations that identified every
individual “substantially involved in or responsible for the criminal conduct”
could be given credit in criminal proceedings, and DOJ attorneys would have
more discretion to offer partial cooperation credit in civil enforcement actions
so long as companies “meaningfully assist[ed]” in the government’s investigation50 and identified individuals “substantially involved in or responsible for
the misconduct.”51 The DOJ incorporated Mr. Rosenstein’s revised policy into
the Justice Manual (i.e., the DOJ publication formerly known as the United States
Attorneys’ Manual). Accordingly, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (now known as the
Justice Manual) was revised to provide: “If the company is unable to identify
all relevant individuals or provide complete factual information despite its
good faith efforts to cooperate fully, the organization may still be eligible for cooperation credit.”52

B. CORPORATE COOPERATION TODAY
Although corporate criminal prosecutions declined during the Trump Administration,53 counsel assisting with executive protection plans in times when DOJ
policies appear more favorable to individual businesspeople cannot count on
those policies remaining in place if a “stormy day” arrives. While DOJ policy
may swing back and forth with different administrations, the overall trend in
prosecutions of both entity and individual defendants is upward.54 The Biden
Administration clearly plans to move aggressively against corporate offenders.
Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco’s fall 2021 announcement signaled the
end of the Rosenstein approach and a return to the Yates Memorandum’s “full
disclosure” mandate.55 Attorney General Merrick Garland’s spring 2022 remarks
resoundingly confirmed the DOJ’s commitment to aggressive efforts to investigate
Oded, Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice: Individual Accountability for Corporate Corruption, 35
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 49 (2016).
49. Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-americanconference-institute-0.
50. Id.
51. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 38, § 9-28.700. For discussion of the implications of this policy
change, see, for example, Kerry L. Myers, DOJ Relaxes the Standard to Receive Cooperation Credit for
Criminal and Civil Corporate Misconduct, ARK. LAW., Spring 2019, at 38.
52. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 38, § 9-28.700.
53. See Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2020).
54. Id. at 110 (noting, for example, that “[b]y 2015, federal prosecutors were charging more financial institutions than ever before”); Oded, supra note 48, at 63 (discussing increase in Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act prosecutions and enforcement actions through 2015).
55. See supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing October 2021 remarks of Deputy Attorney
General Lisa Monaco) and notes 8 & 45 (discussing Attorney General Merrick Garland’s remarks
and the memorandum authored by Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates in September 2022).
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and prosecute culpable conduct involving business entities and their managers,
employees, and agents.56
Review of the outcomes in a number of recent federal prosecutions demonstrates the DOJ’s commitment to prosecution of both business entities and
individuals. In May 2022, for example, Swiss-based Glencore International
A.G. pled guilty to bribery in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,57
as well as fuel market manipulation charges, and agreed to pay more than
$1.1 billion to resolve criminal proceedings against the entity.58 In June 2022,
the former CFO and other senior managers of Dallas-based Earthwater Ltd.
pled guilty to participating in a multi-million dollar high-yield investment
scheme;59 others allegedly involved are awaiting trial in the Northern District
of Texas.60 In April 2022, a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted Roger Ng, a former managing director of
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., of conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act61 and engaging in unlawful commodity market price manipulation in
connection with alleged multi-billion dollar bribery and money-laundering activities involving Malaysia’s state-owned investment and development fund.62
From a practical perspective, business organizations under investigation by
the federal government often have little choice in how to respond. As a result
of these DOJ policies and the threat of associated civil litigation,63 entities
faced with federal criminal investigations, as well as significant civil enforcement
actions, are likely to disclose any information they have pertaining to individuals
connected in any way to the subject of federal investigations. And investigations
are aggressive.64 Moreover, the expectation of corporate cooperation with law
56. See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 11.
57. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq.) [hereinafter FCPA].
58. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Glencore Entered Guilty Pleas to Foreign Bribery and Market Manipulation Schemes (May 18, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/glencore-enteredguilty-pleas-foreign-bribery-and-market-manipulation-conspiracies.
59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Earthwater CFO and Others Plead Guilty to Fraud
Charges Related to High-Yield Investment Scheme ( June 14, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
former-earthwater-cfo-and-others-plead-guilty-fraud-charges-related-high-yield-investment.
60. Id.
61. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Goldman Sachs Investment Banker Convicted in
Massive Bribery and Money Laundering Scheme (Apr. 8, 2022). https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/
pr/former-goldman-sachs-investment-banker-convicted-massive-bribery-and-money-laundering.
62. Id.
63. “Follow-on” civil litigation premised on announcements of criminal or significant civil investigations of entities is routine and inevitable. A recent description of such fall-out can be found in J.P.
Morgan Securities., Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co., 37 N.Y.3d 552 (2021). The opinion details the civil
consequences of an SEC investigation of Bear, Stearns for allegedly assisting its hedge fund customers
in market-timing transactions to the detriment of investors in mutual funds. It also considers the insurability of amounts paid in settlement of such claims where the SEC matter was settled without a
binding admission of liability.
64. An ABA Business Law Section program on corporate investigations held in 2019 presented a
twelve-point checklist for practitioners. Number six on that twelve-point checklist was: “Throw the
guilty under the bus.” Cara Bradley, Erik Christiansen, Ross McGowan, Zain Raheel, James Walker &
Gregory Yadley, Conducting an Effective Internal Investigation—One Chance to Get It Right, ABA
Bus. Law Section Spring 2019 Meeting Program Materials (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.americanbar.
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enforcement agencies against individuals has gained increasing traction globally
as well as in the United States.65
Today, individual directors, officers, and entity managers necessarily operate in
an environment in which they may face involvement in internal investigations, as
well as investigations by the DOJ and other law enforcement authorities. Participating in any investigation, whether it is an internal investigation conducted by
entity counsel or a government inquiry, raises potentially grave consequences
for the individuals involved, particularly at the senior management level.66 The
consequences are not merely financial. Involvement in investigatory proceedings,
follow-on civil or administrative litigation or, worse yet, criminal proceedings, typically has acute adverse consequences for individuals.67 Directors, executives, and
managers often turn to the corporate counsel they already know and trust for
guidance on establishing executive protection plans and navigating their complexities. It is therefore critical for corporate counsel to understand the ethical issues
that arise in connection with these requests.

III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
PROTECTION PLANS

OF

ADVISING

ON

EXECUTIVE

Advising boards and senior executives on executive protection plans requires
counsel to navigate hazardous terrain. Four ethical pitfalls stand out among a
host of potential perils: substantive complexity; possible client identification issues; potential conflicts between the interests of the entity and those of constituents seeking personal protection at the “clear day” drafting stage; and duties to
constituents who collectively embody the client organization yet remain nonclients in their individual capacities.

A. THE COMPLEXITY OF
PROTECTION PLANS

THE

LAW PERTAINING

TO

EXECUTIVE

The very first of the substantive Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires
lawyers to provide competent representation to their clients. The Rule goes on to
define competent representation as encompassing “the legal knowledge, skill,
org/groups/business_law/resources/materials/2019/spring_materials/internal_investigation/. https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/business_law/2019/03/spring/materials/advisingboards-201903.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Lisa K. Osofsky, Lessons from a Global Settlement, ABA CRIM. JUST. MAG., July 15, 2020,
at 4; Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations and the Global Expansion of
Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 SO. CAL. L. REV. 697 (2020); Duggin, supra note 44; Wing & Oringer, supra note 1; Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011).
66. See, e.g., Grindler, supra note 48; Duggin, supra note 44.
67. See Wing & Oringer, supra note 1, at 1126 (“Lawyers who work in this area and have represented executives caught up in investigations and criminal prosecutions know that the stakes are
high. Executives subject to investigation or criminal prosecution may find their health, family relationships, careers, reputations, relationships with colleagues, and personal finances under severe
stress. These individuals often experience intense feelings of depression, fear, and shame as they contemplate losing their reputations and personal liberties. Even if they are ultimately successful in their
defense, their careers and lives can still be damaged or destroyed.”).
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thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”68
The Comments to Rule 1.1 note that “relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter,”69 and that “[p]erhaps the most
fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve.”70
Given the current legal environment with respect to criminal prosecution and
related civil actions, as well as the labyrinthine nature of advancement, indemnification, and insurance law in different states, designing executive protection
plans is an “ethically dangerous, highly complex, and specialized area.”71 Indeed,
a comprehensive executive protection program implicates numerous areas of law
including, among others, the common law of indemnification, state statutes addressing corporate advancement and indemnification, criminal law, contract law,
the law of equitable remedies, fiduciary duties of insurance brokers, and insurance law generally, including state specific and federal regulatory laws that
may bear on an executive’s critical right to prevailing party attorneys’ fees.
Litigation abounds in high stakes matters involving indemnification, even when
executives are cleared of wrongdoing.72 Case law is still developing with respect to
insurance coverage for fines, penalties, and defense costs in the face of admissions
made in settlements with the federal government and resolution of related litigation in the context of the “Cooperation Revolution.”73 Unfortunately, judicial decisions are sometimes inconsistent.74
68. MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2020).
69. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 1.
70. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
71. See James Wing, Geoffrey Fehling & Brian T.M. Mammarella, Training for Tomorrow: 2021
Checklist for Entity Counsel Supervising the Creation or Renewal of an Executive Protection Program in
the Age of “Cooperation,” BUS. L. TODAY (Nov. 2021), https://businesslawtoday.org/2021/11/trainingfor-tomorrow-2021-checklist-for-entity-counsel-supervising-executive-protection-program. The extent and complexity of the drafting issues noted in the article may surprise many practitioners.
72. For two examples, see Field v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 302 So. 3d 930 (Fla. Ct. App. 2020),
and Brown v. Rite Aid Corp., C.A. No. 2017-0480-MTZ, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 186 (May 24, 2019). Both
cases illustrate the complexity, duration, and expense of civil and insurance litigation in this area even
when an executive is acquitted or prevails in enforcing a bar order. Brown, a former Chief Legal Counsel
and Vice-Chairman of Rite Aid was convicted but then included in a bar order in a civil class action. He
litigated for years his rights under the bar order as well as his claimed right to recover his legal costs in
enforcing the order’s limitations on subsequent civil actions. Field’s case revolves around his efforts to
recover millions of dollars in defense costs and prevailing-party legal fees against both the involved entity
and a Lloyd’s–led tower of primary and excess insurance policies after he was acquitted of significant
criminal charges. Field’s potential criminal exposure was first mentioned in 2004, and litigation continues
today. The cited case involves only one aspect of the overall dispute.
73. See supra note 63.
74. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 787 F. Supp. 1424 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (upholding executives’ right to advancement in a dispute over insurers’ obligation to pay defense costs of former corporate officers where the insurers sought to rescind the policies while the underlying criminal and
civil actions were pending), aff ’d, 963 F.3d 385 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 79
F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing executive’s convictions), overruled by United States v. Svete,
556 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2009) (overruling United States v. Brown as incorrectly decided). See
also Emmis Commc’ns Corp. v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 18-3392, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 19795
(7th Cir. July 2, 2019), which opinion the Seventh Circuit withdrew on rehearing because it was fundamentally at odds with accepted insurance industry practice. See Emmis Commc’ns Corp. v. Ill. Nat’l
Ins. Co., 937 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019). For an analysis of the significance of the Emmis decision, see
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Despite these complexities, every lawyer who undertakes the representation of
a client in a matter is ethically obligated to provide competent representation in
that matter. Stated another way, every lawyer is ethically obligated not to undertake a representation for which the lawyer is not competent.75
That said, Comment 2 to Rule 1.1 recognizes that “[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type
with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. . . . A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”76 But this can be a tall
order when it comes to executive protection plans. Perhaps a safer alternative
would be to follow the Comment’s suggestion that “[c]competent representation
can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.”77
Adding to the pressures here is the stress that creating or revising an executive
protection plan can place on its drafters and their own personal interests. Executive protection plans generally come into existence or are renewed on a “clear
day.” Plans are designed to be effective as a means of providing protection for
events that most of those involved hope, and often firmly believe, will never
occur. But when the “stormy day” arrives, the forces at work are likely to stress
and strain every aspect of the plan. The beneficiaries of the plan fervently look
for protection, but they may find that new directors in place following a change
in control, SEC receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, foreclosing creditors, and the
like are frequently hostile to the plan’s beneficiaries.
Counsel’s work begins with a review of an entity’s governing documents. Even
where a corporation’s charter provides for indemnification to the “fullest extent
permitted by law,” however, complex questions still may arise pertaining to the
scope of insurance coverage, the availability of fee advancement, the consequences of settlements, interpretation of bylaw provisions, the availability of protections when the alleged misconduct is not indemnifiable, or unindemnified in
fact, and a host of related matters. The drafting lawyers will be right in the middle, particularly if they have rendered substantive advice on the conduct under
investigation.78
Michael S. Levine & Geoffrey B. Fehling, Seventh Circuit Withdraws Decision, Affirms Coverage for
Emmis Shareholder Lawsuit Despite Notices to Multiple Insurers, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 27, 2019), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7440c5a3-1777-477f-bdf4-73339c5ac4d9.html.
75. MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2020) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation necessary for the representation.”).
76. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
77. Id.
78. Though beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the in-house counsel drafter
or reviewer of the executive protection plan may also be a beneficiary of that very same plan. For
example, general counsel may also be an officer of the entity–e.g., Chief Legal Officer or Vice President of Legal Affairs. This itself could lead to additional conflict-of-interest issues. Moreover, many
cases against other entity officers and directors involve the accused’s good faith or state of mind.
Those individuals may assert the equivalent of an “advice of counsel” defense and thereby implicate
in-house counsel. In-house counsel themselves may then find it necessary to retain personal outside
counsel to advise on matters such as internal and external investigations; grand jury, deposition, and
trial testimony; and seeking personal immunity from criminal prosecution where appropriate. Legal
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In sum, it is critical for corporate counsel to understand the degree of substantive complexity they face when constituents seek their advice on creating, renewing, or even attempting to interpret executive protection plans.79 It is equally
important for corporate counsel to take into account the practical difficulties
constituent beneficiaries of the plan may face in enforcing critical advancement
rights when the constituents are left defenseless should the protections fail or
even if a remedy is merely delayed. Rendering advice in this area is fraught
with uncertainty and demands both considerable expertise in numerous legal
disciplines and awareness of the latest developments.80

B. CLIENT IDENTIFICATION AND RELATED ISSUES
REPRESENTING ENTITIES

THAT

OFTEN ARISE

IN

From a legal ethics standpoint, lawyers who represent entities must recognize
that their client is the entity itself as ABA Model Rule 1.13(a) and the accompanying Comments make clear. Although lawyers for entities communicate with
and receive direction from their entities’ constituents,81 it is critical that the lawyers remember that the constituents are not their clients. It is also essential for
corporate counsel to take steps to ensure that the constituents themselves do
not have the misimpression that corporate counsel represents them personally.
Consider the issues of client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege in
the context of a lawyer (including in-house counsel) representing an entity.
Rule 1.13 provides that communications between the lawyer and constituents
acting in their organizational capacity are protected by Rule 1.6.82 Comment
2 notes: “[B]y way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer
to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of
that investigation between the lawyer and the client’s employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6.”83 As the Comment continues, “[t]his does
not mean . . . that constituents of an organizational client are the clients
of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information
relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly

fees and expenses connected with this representation are all potentially at in-house counsel’s own
expense. See supra note 39.
79. See Wing, Fehling & Mammarella, supra note 71.
80. See Wing & Oringer, supra note 1.
81. MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2020) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”); see also id. R.
1.13 cmt. 1 (“An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers,
directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. ‘Other constituents’ as used in this Comment
means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons
acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.”).
82. Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 2 (“When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates
with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6.”).
83. Id.

Giving Advice on Executive Protection Issues

1095

authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation
or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.”84
Likewise, the attorney-client privilege generally protects confidential communications between the attorney and constituents made to facilitate legal advice to
the entity client. That privilege, however, belongs to the lawyer’s entity client and
not to the individual non-client constituents.85 Consequently, corporate counsel
requested or instructed to advise an entity’s directors and officers with respect to
an executive protection plan often find themselves in an awkward and professionally challenging position.
Rule 1.13 recognizes that, when the interests of the entity and those of constituents are generally aligned, the lawyer may represent both the entity and
the constituents with the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of the respective clients.86 However, the Rule also acknowledges that there are times when
the interests of the entity and those of a constituent are, or may become, adverse.
In these circumstances, a lawyer representing the entity should correct a constituent’s misunderstanding of the identity of the lawyer’s client (i.e., the entity).87
In a similar vein, ABA Model Rule 4.3 provides: “In dealing on behalf of a client
with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply
that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”88
Rule 4.3 cautions that lawyers are not to give advice to unrepresented persons
84. Id. ABA Model Rule 1.13 applies to both corporate entity clients and unincorporated entity
clients. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Resp. Formal Op. 91-361, at 1 ( July 12, 1991)
(“A partnership is an organization within the meaning of Rule 1.13. Generally, a lawyer who represents a partnership represents the entity rather than the individual partners.”).
85. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2001). In that case, a former
attorney and two former officers of a corporate subsidiary challenged the decisions of the subsidiary
and its parent corporation to waive attorney-client privilege and work product protections on
grounds that an existing joint defense agreement precluded the waiver. The court held that the
two officers could “mount a claim of attorney-client privilege only if, and to the extent that, [the lawyer] represented them individually. If the only attorney-client privilege at stake is that of their corporate employer, then [the entity’s] waiver defeats the claim of privilege. After all, the law is settled
that a corporation’s attorney-client privilege may be waived by current management. . . . It is often
difficult to determine whether a corporate officer or employee may claim an attorney-client privilege
in communications with corporate counsel. The default assumption is that the attorney only represents the corporate entity, not the individuals within the corporate sphere, and it is the individuals’
burden to dispel that presumption. This makes perfect sense because an employee has a duty to assist
his employer’s counsel in the investigation and defense of matters pertaining to the employer’s business.” (internal citations omitted).
86. See MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g) (2020) (“A lawyer representing an organization
may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization’s consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other
than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.”).
87. See id. R. 1.13(f ) (“In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”).
88. Id. R. 4.3.
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“other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.”89
One important reason for the corporate lawyer to clarify the identity of the client and to correct any misunderstanding a constituent might have about the identity of the client is to avoid the inadvertent creation of an attorney-client
relationship with the individual constituent. The test for the existence of an
attorney-client relationship may best be described as “the subjective reasonable belief ” of the would-be client,90 even though, as the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers recognizes, an attorney-client relationship typically is consensual, with the attorney consenting to the representation.91 Both aspects of the
“subjective reasonable belief ” test must be present. Certainly, the would-be client
must have a “subjective belief ” that the attorney is representing (or is willing to
represent) the client with respect to a particular matter, but that belief must be
a “reasonable” one based on objective criteria.92
In-house corporate counsel work side-by-side with the non-lawyer client constituents who are their business counterparts. These corporate counsel, as well as
many outside lawyers, often function as integral members of business teams and
provide advice to a wide variety of constituents on the need to correct existing
problems and the legality of proposed actions. In these situations, it can be difficult for non-lawyer constituents to recognize that their corporate counsel
colleagues represent the entity and are not providing the constituents with individual legal advice. It therefore behooves the lawyers to clarify whom they
represent. In addition, it is also important to clearly identify those within the organization who are authorized to direct lawyers in their representation of the
organizational client.93 This is an ongoing concern.
89. Id.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. e (2000) (“Even when a lawyer
has not communicated willingness to represent a client, a client-lawyer relationship arises when the
person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide services, and the lawyer, who reasonably should
know of this reliance, does not inform the person that the lawyer will not do so (see §14(1)(b);
see also § 51(2)). . . . In appraising whether the person’s reliance was reasonable, courts consider
that lawyers ordinarily have superior knowledge of what representation entails and that lawyers
often encourage clients and potential clients to rely upon them.”); see also Span Enters. v. Wood,
274 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App. 2008) (“An attorney-client relationship is a contractual agreement
that can be created by express contract or implied from the actions of the parties. We must determine
whether a contract can be implied using an objective standard, looking at what the parties said and
did, and we do not consider their unstated, subjective beliefs.” (internal citations omitted)).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. b (2000).
92. Section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides, in relevant part,
that:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: . . . (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so,
and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer
to provide the services[.]
Id. § 14.
93. Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate
Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 180 (2001). Professor Kim further recognizes that: “As a general
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Clarifying just who is (and who is not) a lawyer’s client may be even more difficult when an entity’s organizers, directors, or officers request or instruct the
lawyer to develop comprehensive executive protection plans. It can be particularly challenging for lawyers to respond to requests to design executive protection plans that provide for the advancement of legal fees, indemnification, and
insurance coverage, to “the fullest extent permitted by law,”94 should the individual constituent be the subject of civil litigation or criminal investigation or indictment. Here, too, a number of Rules of Professional Conduct are implicated.
Assume that the lawyer has established that the entity’s individual constituents
are not the lawyer’s clients and that the lawyer is comfortable that the affected
constituents are likewise not confused. Even then, the lawyer nonetheless has
a duty under ABA Model Rule 4.1 not to “knowingly . . . (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person [such as a non-client constituent];
or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.”95
Some of the most difficult ethical issues arise when an organizational client,
acting through its governing body, instructs the lawyer to analyze an executive
protection program in place and then evaluate it from the standpoint of providing maximum protection to the entity’s directors and covered executives. The affected constituents—i.e., the entity’s individual directors and officers—are not
the lawyer’s clients. On a future “stormy day,” the “Cooperation Revolution”
matter, the lawyer may look to the authorized managers of the corporation, namely, the senior executive officers, to speak on behalf of the corporate client. Difficulties arise, however, when the interests
of managers and the corporation diverge. . . . The Model Rules recognize the board of directors to be
the highest authority in the corporation. Because the corporate client usually makes and voices its
final decisions through its board of directors, the corporate lawyer may rely ultimately on the
board for guidance in the representation.” Id. at 181–82.
94. This phrase or equivalent language appears in many corporate bylaws and agreements providing for advancement and indemnification. A duty of an insured entity to indemnify covered individuals
to the “fullest extent permitted by law” appears in many D&O insurance policies as a “presumption”
underlying the entity’s right to indemnification, which coverage generally attaches only after payment
of a significant retention. The language has been a part of the Model Business Corporation Act for
years. It was inserted to counter the ruling by the late Delaware Chancellor Allen in Advanced Mining
Systems v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82 (Del. Ch. 1992). Fricke involved an action brought by a corporation
against its former president alleging that he had breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company
during his tenure in office. Id. at 82–84. When the former president sought to compel the corporation
to advance legal fees and expenses in connection with his defense, the Chancery Court held that a
promise merely to indemnify did not grant an executive a right to advancement. Id. at 85. The ruling
surprised many practitioners. New York corporate law was and is to the contrary, although the New
York statute conditions a right to court-ordered advancement upon a factual showing by the executive
that may seriously compromise an accused executive’s Fifth Amendment privileges. This is an example
of the law’s complexity. This impediment to advancement can only be overcome by astute drafting.
95. MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2020). As a (hopefully) extreme example, a lawyer should
not sit silently when the lawyer hears a human resources director extoll the organization’s health insurance plan to a group of employees without mentioning that the policy has a less than conspicuous
cancer exclusion.
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may result in one or more of those same directors and officers being personally
identified as potential or actual targets of criminal prosecution. It may well be in
the entity’s interests to see those individuals convicted.96 How should the entity’s
counsel react?
Consider the frequent example of one or more concerned board members who
seek assurance from the entity’s in-house counsel that they will be protected
against future unknown and currently unanticipated claims. This inquiry goes
to the very existence of the “Cooperation Revolution.” The lawyer’s response
may have serious ramifications for constituents when they need those protections most.97 ABA Model Rule 2.3(a) provides little assistance; it merely recognizes that a lawyer may “provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client
for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes
that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.”98
Surely this Rule applies to corporate closing opinions addressing routine matters such as the validity of an entity’s organization, its governing body’s valid
adoption of deal documents, and their due execution. But Rule 2.3(a) provides
scant comfort to an entity lawyer asked to assure non-client directors and covered executives that an executive protection program in place today will adequately protect them—or even offers the best possible protection—should
they be falsely accused of complicity in a crime or fraud against the entity, the
government, or a third party by a real malefactor or even an entity’s own investigatory counsel.
Application of Rule 2.3(a) would require the lawyer first to determine whether
the instructions given by the board with respect to reviewing or drafting an executive protection plan are actually in the best interests of the entity client. That
is often going to be the case, as a number of courts have recognized.99 Even so,
96. As noted above, see supra Part III.A, even if an entity’s charter provides for indemnification to
the “fullest extent permitted by law,” disagreements over the reach of the law, the availability of fee
advancement, and many other issues may arise.
97. For example, a real issue is presented when an entity constituent in an internal or external
investigation of alleged wrongdoing asserts Fifth Amendment protections and, as a result, is fired.
In drafting or analyzing the executive protection program, the in-house counsel may need to address
that issue up front with officers and directors, so that—at a minimum—the entity and the constituents know what to expect if and when the constituent is a target of an investigation and asserts Fifth
Amendment rights.
98. MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (2020); see also Murray v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d
173, 177 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing N.Y. RULES PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) and stating that “[n]ot every beneficiary of a lawyer’s advice is deemed a client”).
99. See Wing & Oringer, supra note 1, at 1127 n.14, 1130 n.20; William D. Johnston & Elizabeth
S. Bradley, Indemnification and Insurance for Directors and Officers, CORP. PRACTICE PORTFOLIO SERIES
(Bloomberg BNA Corp. Prac. Portfolio Ser. 54-3d, 2014) (citing and considering both Delaware
and Model Act law and discussing differences in legal approach to drafting for advancement between
corporate bylaws and alternative entity management agreements and insurance policies). Underscoring the acceptance of Delaware’s emphasis on the contractual nature of advancement and mandatory
indemnification protections is the lead New York case of Ficus Investments, Inc. v. Private Capital Management, LLC, 61 A.D.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). In Ficus, a dispute over fee advancement arose in a
case brought by a limited liability company against its former chief executive officer alleging misappropriation of company funds and assets. The court held that the defendant CEO was entitled to fee
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this first step should not be overlooked because the ultimate beneficiaries of the
lawyer’s work for the entity client will be the non-client entity constituents. Likewise, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer’s work will “affect the [entity]
client’s interests materially and adversely,” and—if that is the case—the lawyer may
not provide the analysis unless the client consents.100 Granted, considering it is the
board that is instructing the lawyer to proceed, the consent already has been impliedly given. As long as the lawyer reasonably believes that it is in the best interest
of the entity client to comply with those instructions, the lawyer may go forward.
Now suppose the board goes further: it not only asks the lawyer to evaluate or
design an executive protection plan, but also requests the lawyer to advise the
constituents independently of the lawyer’s representation of the entity, with
the sole objective of maximizing their personal protection. The lawyer is being
asked, essentially, to provide legal advice to otherwise non-client (and perhaps
unrepresented) entity constituents that will obligate the entity to advance defense costs to resist an investigation, on a future “stormy day,” of civil or criminal
charges that the entity as a whole fervently wishes will succeed. Here, the lawyer
is placed in a truly unenviable position.
In the end, while it remains the province of the entity’s officers and directors
to make the decisions and to instruct corporate counsel on the entity’s goals and
objectives, corporate counsel is often an integral part of the entity’s decisionmaking process. Consequently, the risks outlined above often cannot be avoided.
The following discussion offers ideas for addressing these risks.

IV. SUGGESTIONS

FOR

NAVIGATING DANGEROUS TERRAIN

Whenever an entity’s governing body instructs the entity’s lawyer, particularly
in-house counsel, to evaluate or design an executive protection plan for the exclusive protection of entity constituents, it would be easy to interpret such an
instruction as effectively causing counsel to assume the duties of an attorney
to individuals he or she does not formally represent. Worse, these kinds of instructions essentially ask counsel to draft programs to protect those individuals
from the adverse consequences of a future situation in which conflicts of interest
may well exist as a result of the “Cooperation Revolution.” It is unlikely that the
entity’s constituents will appreciate this conflict. As suggested earlier, it is essential for prudent corporate counsel to recognize these and related issues from the
outset. Taking appropriate steps on the “clear day” can help to prevent future
advancement pursuant to the company’s operating agreement: “Although ultimately Donovan may
not be entitled to indemnification, the issuance of injunctive relief against him during this litigation
does not bar him from receiving advancement of his expenses under the terms of the Operating
Agreement.” Id. at 10. Ficus has been cited for the proposition that New York law looks to the law
of Delaware on issues of contractual advancement and indemnification. See, e.g., Ryu v. Hope Bancorp, Inc., 18 Civ. 1236, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70509, at *23 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 26, 2018) (magistrate’s decision), adopted by 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169660 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 786 F. App’x. 271 (2d.
Cir. 2019) (summary order). Other states, including those that follow the Model Business Corporation Act, may take different approaches, which is one of the reasons that practice in this area is so
challenging.
100. See MODEL RULES PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(b) (2020).
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misunderstandings and mitigate the impact of any disagreements that subsequently may arise.
In our view, the best approach is to educate the constituents about the lawyer’s
role and fiduciary obligations and, depending on the specific circumstances, obtain informed consent, confirmed in writing, and take the specific steps outlined
above: acquire necessary substantive expertise, clarify the identity of the client,
communicate the possibility of future conflicts of interest (particularly if there
is a change in control of the entity), and convey the limitations on corporate
counsel’s advice pertaining to executive protection plans in the current legal environment. Perhaps most importantly, documenting associated communications
helps mitigate the risk of “stormy day” hazy recollections of what was (or was
not) disclosed or discussed, and what instructions the entity’s board did (or
did not) give to the lawyer.
We consider these steps to be “best practices” rather than ethical mandates. As
such, corporate counsel should judge for themselves what measures they should
take in particular circumstances. But it is essential for counsel to ensure that
there is clarity as to the identity of the client and as to the instructions of
what the lawyer is to do. To the extent clarity is lacking, counsel should try
to correct any perceived misunderstanding of counsel’s role and the limits of
the representation.

A. DEVELOP

OR

OBTAIN RELEVANT EXPERTISE

First and foremost, it is important for corporate counsel to be sensitive to the
complexity of executive protection issues and the number of different legal disciplines they involve. Providing advice in this area is not something to undertake
lightly. Doing so requires a significant level of expertise and familiarity with all of
the relevant issues. Corporate lawyers who are instructed by entity constituents
to provide advice on these matters need to consider whether to spend the time
necessary to develop that expertise or, instead, obtain assistance from lawyers
who regularly work in these areas. Admittedly, it will probably be the rare occurrence when the executive protection plan representation will go wrong; however,
the potential magnitude of the consequences of a plan going wrong are immense.
As a result, drafting or advising on an executive protection program is not an
area of law in which a corporate lawyer should dabble.
For those who choose to proceed with evaluating an existing executive protection plan or designing a new plan, the ABA’s 2021 Checklist for Entity Counsel
Supervising the Creation or Renewal of an Executive Protection Program is an
invaluable tool.101 It offers steps to analyze the issues, as they presently exist,
pertaining to a combination of the protections in the separate areas of exculpation, advancement, indemnification, and insurance. The Checklist also gives entity counsel an inventory to provide to specialty outside counsel to help ensure
that the relevant steps required of the entity have been taken and that known
101. Wing, Fehling & Mammarella, supra note 71.
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drafting issues have been dealt with. The Checklist is updated as the law
develops.

B. CLARIFY WHO IS

THE

CLIENT

Corporate counsel must always keep in mind that the entity itself—not its
constituents—is the real client. In-house counsel in particular must remain
steadfast in their willingness to remind constituents tactfully, yet firmly, that
the lawyer represents the entity and not individual constituents.102
Admittedly, establishing and then maintaining in the eyes of non-client constituents the understanding that the entity’s lawyer represents the entity and not
the individual constituents may be one of the most difficult and sensitive issues
facing in-house counsel. In-house counsel and other lawyers who work regularly
with entity constituents may want to begin on the “clear day” to lay the groundwork about their role and its limitations, as well as the constituents’ own
fiduciary duties, before far more uncomfortable conversations need take place.
Counsel should be very clear that constituents are not individually or collectively
their clients. Conveying this understanding can take place early in counsel’s relationship with the entity, especially whenever constituents approach the lawyer
with personal legal questions or the constituent makes off-hand remarks referring to counsel as “my lawyer.”
It is important for entity lawyers, particularly in-house counsel, to become adept
at refraining from providing personal legal advice to constituents, reminding them
that in-house counsel represents the entity, and perhaps even having a list of outside lawyers to whom in-house counsel can refer constituents. Where feasible, inhouse counsel may want to organize routine training for both new and existing
102. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 99–100, a lawyer has an ethical obligation
to look out for the best interests of the client even where the instructions originate with the entity’s
governing authority. While in-depth analysis of a lawyer’s obligation when a governing authority appears to be acting contrary to the best interests of the entity is beyond the scope of this article, we
note that this “looking out for the best interests” of the entity client is itself recognized in Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.13(b) and (c), which authorize the attorney for the organization, including in-house counsel, to “report up,” or even “report out,” under certain circumstances:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated
with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related
to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation
of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in
the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority
in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that
can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if (1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with
paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or
fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly
a violation of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.

1102

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 77, Fall 2022

constituents to address not only each constituent’s fiduciary duties generally but
also to explain counsel’s role as the lawyer for the entity and not for the individuals. These kinds of training sessions could involve outside counsel so that the
message conveyed to the constituents comes from someone other than the inhouse lawyer. Perhaps too, having the message conveyed by outside counsel
may help constituents realize that even outside counsel with whom they regularly
work owe their allegiance to the entity itself rather than to those who hire them.
Counsel should be able to explain not only the ethical obligations they have
to their actual client—i.e., the entity—but that they necessarily owe a duty of
loyalty to the entity itself rather than individual constituents. In addition, it
would be helpful in such discussions for the corporate lawyer to address issues
such as attorney-client privilege and the possible future ramifications of a rift between the entity and a particular constituent.
With respect to the client identification issue, it is useful to note the subtle but
important distinction between (a) explaining a concept to a non-client—here,
that an executive protection plan exists and is (or is not) intended to deal
with developments and difficulties that may arise as a result of the “Cooperation
Revolution”—and (b) providing legal advice to the non-client. In that regard, it
behooves the prudent corporate lawyer explaining an executive protection
plan to remind constituents that the lawyer is not providing the individual
any legal advice, but is merely explaining what the plan says or what the plan
is intended to cover.
In the context of discussing executive protection plans, a prudent lawyer
would set forth in a writing shared among those constituents—and even perhaps
a writing that the constituents sign—the lawyer’s understanding of who is (and
who is not) the lawyer’s client(s) and evidencing both the disclosures and explanations that the lawyer provided the constituents on the above-noted issue,
along with a recitation of the board’s directions to the lawyer following such explanations and disclosures.
Ordinarily, it is ultimately the entity’s senior constituents, namely its officers
and directors, who decide what is in the entity’s best interest. If a “stormy day”
arrives, however, documentation of both counsel’s disclosures to the board and
the board’s instructions to counsel will serve both the lawyer and the entity client
well.
Laying the groundwork about the roles and responsibilities of an entity’s counsel should allow for more comfortable conversations with constituents whenever
individual legal issues arise and especially when the governing body asks counsel
to draft or review an executive protection program.

C. EXPLAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONSENT WHERE POSSIBLE

A

CONFLICT

AND

OBTAIN WRITTEN

Ideally, in-house counsel instructed by constituents on evaluating or designing an executive protection program would also explain to the constituents
the possibility of a conflict between their individual interests and those of the
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entity. This is a difficult discussion at best. No one wants to hear that they will be
left on their own if something bad happens. Central to this conversation is the
“Cooperation Revolution.” Encouraging constituents to seek independent outside counsel (and perhaps offering to facilitate such independent outside
representation) is the minimum counsel can do, if for no other purpose than
to underscore the severity of the potential conflict. If, despite such disclosures,
the directors or other constituents persist in demanding and instructing that inhouse counsel provide advice on the protections being made available to them, it
would behoove the prudent in-house counsel to have the constituents acknowledge the potential conflict and provide their informed consent, in writing, to
waive the possible conflicts between the in-house counsel’s duties of loyalty to
the entity and counsel’s duty to the constituents and covered executives.

D. BE CLEAR ABOUT

THE

LIMITS

OF

YOUR ADVICE

Even if every substantive point of the Checklist is considered and properly included in the resulting executive protection plan, there is, of course, no guarantee
that courts will respect the drafters’ and beneficiaries’ intent. Prosecutorial policies
continue to wax and wane. Judicial decisions and insurance law constantly evolve
and develop nuances that the Checklist has not expressly considered. No lawyer
can guarantee that all of the drafting suggestions that are recommended will be
followed by judges who are asked to enforce the law in an atmosphere of entity
hysteria, public opprobrium, or just plain “bad facts.” It is important to be clear
about the limits of legal advice in this complex area.

CONCLUSION
The “Cooperation Revolution” has fundamentally altered the relationship between directors and officers, on the one hand, and the entities they serve on the
other. Tensions between entities and their constituents are inevitable whenever
allegations of wrongdoing arise, an investigation is initiated, or law enforcement
authorities come knocking. Litigation over efforts to maximize executive protection has revealed a morass of issues pertaining to governance, indemnification,
fee advancement, and insurance law.
It is the board’s obligation to make the ultimate decisions on the nature and
scope of executive protection plans, but boards almost invariably turn to corporate counsel for assistance. When boards call for help, corporate counsel necessarily enter into complex substantive areas fraught with potential ethical hazards.
There are no easy answers when it comes to determining how to navigate these
treacherous waters. The first step for counsel is to remind the board that it has
the responsibility to determine whether the entity will provide contractually
mandated protections to officers and directors at all. Once the board chooses
to do so (as it usually does) and instructs counsel to oversee the task, prudent
counsel should confirm that direction in writing. Counsel then need to recognize
the risks associated with following these instructions, as well as attendant ethical
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obligations, and take steps to address them. Even where the entity’s charter already contains a “fullest extent” provision, counsel need to be cognizant of the
perils inherent in interpreting the vague protection such a provision affords individual executives, as well as the complexities involved in enhancing them by
means such as improved bylaws and insurance coverage. Counsel can address
these risks by acquiring the appropriate expertise themselves or with assistance
from other lawyers who are expert in the relevant fields. Counsel should help
constituents understand that counsel represents the entity rather than individuals, obtain informed consent where appropriate, and clarify the limits of their
advice. By taking these kinds of steps, entity counsel go a long way toward offering the best possible assistance to their clients and appropriately protecting
themselves.

